Agudath Israel Of America Deeply Disappointed By U.S. Court Of Appeals Ruling On DOMA

Agudath Israel of America released the following statment today in response to the Court of Appeals ruling on DOMA. Agudath Israel of America is deeply disappointed by the ruling handed down by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit that found the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) to be unconstitutional. The decision will do much harm to traditional marriage, but its implications will have a much farther reach.

The court held that the moral justification for maintaining the historic definition of marriage was not a sufficient reason for the federal government to legislatively define marriage in the traditional manner. Agudath Israel argued in an amicus brief submitted to the court in this case that moral considerations are, and historically have been, a rational basis – indeed, even a compelling interest – for enacting social legislation.

The court’s rejection of this argument threatens to erase “morality” as a foundation for legislative action – a result with potentially severe and far-reaching societal effects.”

Agudath Israel has been a strong supporter of DOMA since its inception, having – among other things – testified in its support before the U.S. Senate Judiciary Committee in 1996. We will continue to support this vital statute as it likely makes its way up to the United States Supreme Court for final review. TLS.

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4 COMMENTS

  1. A married B describes not only a duty between A and B, but relinquishment of their autonomy to be with members of the population at large. Similarly, C, a third party member of society who is not married to B, has a duty arising out of the public act in which A married B, to abstain from being with B, even if C has the consent of B, or the consent of A, or both.

    The difference between the marriage of A and B, a man and a woman, from the marriage of A and B, of the same gender, say, both women, is easily seen in the demand that C abstain from being with B, a woman, when she is married to A, a man. We expect C to share in this determination, as right and wrong are logical concepts valid for all. By contrast, we cannot universally proscribe, C, or any man, from taking B, with her consent, who is a woman living without man.

    The moral proscription upon the public that arises out of marriage is a matter well beyond the competence of the federal and state judiciaries to expand under their equal protection clauses, and within the power of the state legislatures, and the Congress under federal jurisdiction, to restrict to husband and wife.

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